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1 Some privacy killing sides of the Internet Technology 
1.1 The Intel Processor Serial Number  
Since many years, the central processors units (CPU), the heart of the computer, have been identified trough a Serial 
Number written on the top cover of the chip. Intel announced on January 1999 that he was planning to include a unique 
Processor Serial Number (PSN) in every one of its new Pentium III chips (earlier implementations in PII for laptops 
have been reported). What is new with the Intel Processor Number is that the Serial Number is not only on the top 
cover of the chip but is part of the electronic circuit of the chip itself. It means that a dedicated processor instruction can 
get his unique Id as a result of an instruction. This instruction can be included in an applet Java or in an Active-X 
control and then included in an HTML page. The PSN will then be transmitted to the Web site issuing the Web page 
containing the applet or the control. Technically speaking, the PSN can be disabled by turning off a particular flag. Intel 
claims that  
 the flag will be turned off by default (in fact this depends of the BIOS1 manufacturer’s)  
 the status of identification will be visible on the screen (e.g. on the task bar of Windows)(in fact this is the task of 
the Operating System builders)  
 the PSN cannot be turned on without powercycling the computer. Some hacker organisations seem to have 
demonstrated that it was in fact possible to enable this number without turning the computer off and on2. 
A description of the Intel PSN controversy can be found on http://www.bigbrotherinside.com. According to Intel, the 
PSN will be used to identify users in electronic commerce and other net-based applications. Many privacy advocate 
organisations have protested and asked the FTC to oblige Intel to suppress the accessibility of the PSN via the Internet. 
Intel has presented the PSN as an improvement for the Web security and as a secure identifier for doing E banking. 
Unfortunately, this PSN has not yet been used by any bank for such a purpose and security specialists like Bruce 
Schneier don’t believe that the PSN is secure enough to provide such a requirement.3  
                                                          
1  Basic Input and Output System. This is a basic program stored in a Read Only Memory and used during the 
startup of the computer. This program is the first one to be executed and will namely read the boot sector on 
the hard disk and load the first instruction of the Operating System installed on it. 
2  “Pentium III serial number is soft switchable after all”  at http://www.heise.de/ct/english/99/05/news1/  
3  “As a cryptographer, I cannot design a secure system to validate identification, enforce copy protection, or 
secure e-commerce using a processor ID. It doesn't help. It's just too easy to  hack.” Cited in 
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/comment/0,5859,2194863,00.html  
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1.2 Microsoft Global Unique IDentifier 
At the beginning of March 99, the NY Times reported that a specific ID, called Global Unique Identifier (GUID), was 
systematically and automatically incorporated in each Excel97, Word97 or Powerpoint97 Document4 5. In fact, it 
appears that this GUID was based on the identification of the Ethernet card installed on the computer. As a response, 
Microsoft has published on its Web site6 two programs 
 Microsoft Office 97 Unique Identifier Patch  This patch, once applied will prevent the insertion of a unique 
identifier number in all new Office documents.  
 Microsoft Office 97 Unique Identifier Removal Tool  :  This is a utility that can be used to remove the unique 
identifier from previously created Office 97 documents. Customers who are concerned about the presence of the 
unique identifier number can run the utility against one or several documents at a time.  
Simultaneously, Microsoft announced that  Office 2000 doesn’t include the ability to insert unique identifier numbers 
in documents. 
Following personal experimentation performed during October 1999, it appears that the two programs mentioned above 
require the installation of two “Services Release”. The respective size of SR1 and SR2 are 8.683 Kb and 23.704 
kilobytes, which represent about more then three hours of downloading time at the theoretical-never reached speed of 
28.800 bit per second. 
1.3 Browser chattering 
Every surfer knows that typing http://www.website.org/index.htm means something like “show me the page named 
“index.htm” on the server www.website.org by using the HTTP protocol. One can conclude that no more than the 
TCP/IP address of the surfer and the file he wants to see are transmitted to the Web site. This is not correct. Here below 
are listed some of the data systematically transmitted in the HTTP header while doing the HTTP request. 
TABLE I :AUTOMATIC BROWSER CHATTERING WHILE DOING HTTP REQUEST7 
 
HTTP Var. Opera 3.50 Netscape 4.0 Fr Explorer 4.0 UK 
GET GET /index.html HTTP/1.0 GET /index.html HTTP/1.0 GET /index.html HTTP/1.0 
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0(compatible; Opera/3.0; 
Windows 95) 3.50 
Mozilla/4.04 [fr] (Win95; I ;Nav) 
 
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 4.01; 
Windows 95) 
Accept :  image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, 
*/* 
image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, 
image/pjpeg, application/vnd.ms-excel, 
application/msword, application/vnd.ms-
                                                          
4  http://www.junkbusters.com/ht/en/microsoft.html#history  
5  http://www.techserver.com/noframes/story/0,2294,25591-41382-304399-0,00.html  
6  http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/1999/03-08custletter2.htm  
7  In fact, other data are such as the keep-alive or the host field can also be transmitted but their impact on privacy 
is weak or null, so they are not cited or explained below 
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powerpoint, */* 
Referer :   Where.were.you/doc.htm Where.were.you/doc.htm 
Language :  fr fr-be 
 
The technical definition of those fields can be found in the RFC 19458 for HTTP 1.0 or in the RFC 20689 for HTTP 1.1. 
We can notice  
 The first line is the only one which remains indispensable 
 In the Accept: line, every browser is telling that the netizen is using Windows 95 (why?). Netscape adds 
that the browser version is a French one. Every browser give his own name, version and sub-version 
identification. 
 While describing the accepted formats, Microsoft tells every site that the netizen’s computer has 
Powerpoint, Excel, and Word installed on it. 
 Opera doesn’t disclose the referring page. 
 Opera doesn’t reveal the language spoken. Netscape reveals that the netizen is French speaking. 
Microsoft reveal that the netizen is Belgian, French speaking.  
The chattering phenomenon is not exclusively related to browser and appears to be a general practice of many Internet 
software like Email or FTP client or server programs.  
1.4 Invisible hyperlinks10 
Hyperlinks are the added value of Internet. They permit browsing from one continent to the other simply by a mouse 
click. What is hidden to the eyes of the common user is that classical browsing software enables to include HTTP 
requests to download images to be included in the HTML page code. Those images have not to be located on the same 
server as the one who has received the original call for a particular Web page. In this case, the HTTP_REFERER 
variable contains the referring page reference, i.e. the main page in which the images will be located. In other words : if 
a Web site includes in its Web page in HTML an invisible link to an image located on the Web site of a cybermarketing 
company, this last one will know the referring page before sending the advertising banner. While doing a research on a 
search engine the name of the Web page includes the keywords typed. 
1.5 Cookies 
The cookies issues have already been widely discussed11. The SET-COOKIE is taking place in the HTTP response 
header12, namely in invisible hyperlinks. If a duration is mentioned13, the cookie will be stored on the netizen’s hard 
                                                          
8  http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc1945/rfc1945  
9  http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2068/rfc2068  
10  Invisible hyperlink seems us a better wording than the wording used by David Kristol in the so-called cookies 
II specification (http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2109/rfc2109 ). D. Kristol spoke about unverifiable 
hyperlinks. In fact, those hidden hyperlinks are verifiable. But, due to the fact that they are not visible and 
automatic, they remains widely unverified. 
11  Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, “ The Internet and Privacy Legislation: Cookies for a Treat?”, 
http://www.wvjolt.wvu.edu/wvjolt/current/issue1/articles/mayer/mayer.htm; Stephen H. Wildstrom, “Privacy 
and the Cookie Monster”, Business Week, December 1996. 
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disk and sent back to the Web site originating the cookie (or Web sites from the same sub domain). This sending back  
will take the form of a COOKIE field taking place in the browser chattering described above. When put together with 
browser chattering and invisible hyperlinks, it means that, by default14, a cybermarketing company knows all the 
keywords typed by a particular netizen15 on the search engine on which he is advertising, the computer, operating 
system, browser brand of the netizen, the TCP/IP address he has using and the time and duration of the HTTP sessions. 
Those raw data permit to infer some new data like16 
1. The country where the netizen live 
2. The Internet domain to which he belongs 
3. Sector of activity of the company employing the netizen 
4. Turnover and size of the employing company 
5. Function and position of the surfer within this company 
6. Internet Access Provider 
7. Typology of Web sites currently visited. 
 
The cookie permits a permanent, unique and systematic identification because it is systematically sent with every 
request of information. To the opposite, the TCP/IP address remains a relatively weak identifier because it can be 
hidden by proxies and due to its dynamic characteristic for netizens accessing to Internet by modem. Such invisible 
profiling has been already done by many US cybermarketing companies and many tens of millions of European 
netizens are probably profiled in the database of Double Click in New York17. 
1.5.1 Specification for a privacy compliant cookie. 
The privacy killing side of the cookie lies in to the way in which it has been used. The principle of “notice and choice” 
can easily be applied to a cookie. Under article 10 of the European Directive 95/4618, it means that before sending a 
SET COOKIE header, a Web site has to inform the consumer by communicating 
a) his identity,  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
12  Technically speaking, it is also possible to implement cookies in JavaScript or in the <META-HTTP EQUIV> 
fields located in the HTML code. For more information see 
http://www.junkbusters.com/ht/en/ijbfaq.html#cookies 
13  Cookies with no duration specified are called “session cookies” and disappear when the browser is unloaded or 
when the socket close. 
14  Recent browsers provide the ability to block unwanted cookies. See point 4.1 below. 
15  More precisely, those data are linked to a particular personal computer that can be used by many people. From 
a legal point of view, those data has to be considered as personal data, just as it is already the case with plate 
and phone numbers which are considered unanimously by data protection authorities as being personal data in 
the sense of art. 2 a) of the European directive 95/46. 
16 Serge Gauthronet, “On-line services and data protection and the protection of privacy” European Commission, 
1998, p.31 and 92 available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/media/dataprot/studies/servint.htm 
17  For Double click only, about 26 millions netizens in March 1997 (Gauthronet, op. cit., p. 86) and more then 
thousand millions of cybermarketing banners downloaded each month outside US (ibid., p. 96) 
18  “Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data” (published 
in the OJEC of 23 Nov 1995, L281, p.31).  
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b) what information will be stored in the cookie  
c) the purpose for which he intends to use this information.  
d) the recipients of the collected information 
e) which data are mandatory and what happens if not given 
f) the existence of an access and rectification right 
g) the existence of an opposition right if the data are collected for marketing purposes (under art. 14 b) 
 
Having read this short notice on the default home page, the netizen should be able to choose an identifying cookie (like 
UserId=AZFD4309) or an anonymous cookie (like UserId=X19). In fact, this solution has been offered by 
DoubleClick20 but remains little used21 because the common netizen is unaware of the cookies issue, and even more, of 
the invisible hyperlink phenomenon. 
It becomes then very easy for the Web site to build a dedicated page for the access right of the data subject. While 
accessing to this dedicated Web page, the browser will communicate in his header a identifying cookie, an anonymous 
cookie or no cookie at all. If no identifying cookie is sent, there is no specific information about the netizen. If there is 
an identifying or an anonymous cookie, then it is very easy to access to his specific information and to send him back 
into the dedicated access page. 
1.5.2 The cookie’s weaknesses for the marketing 
1. The cookie in itself is not privacy killing, but due to the invisible and unfair way in which it has been widely used, 
he has been perceived as a symbol. Following a raising awareness of the netizen versus privacy on the Internet, a 
second cookie specification is under construction and will normally lead to a better privacy protection (RFC 2109).  
2. By storing the identifier on each hard disk of each netizen, the cookie permits systematic authentication, but, at the 
same time, allow the informed netizen to modify, to exchange or to delete his own authentication. The databases of 
cookies stored will lose the major part of their marketing value if the identifier no longer refers to an existing 
cookie stored somewhere on a computer (for instance if a the computer disk crashes, if a new computer is bought 
or if a cookie killer program is used). 
3. Even if the cookie meta data fields22 have been normalised, the critical VALUE field remains not normalised and it 
became very difficult for the cybermarketing companies to interconnect different cookie databases related to the 
same netizens to draw a global profile. 
4. The data linked to the cookie are quite basic and do not reveal the revenues, the SSN, the physical or electronic 
address, the credit card number, the gender, the education or the family structure of the netizen. Even if those data 
have been collected by electronic forms and are stored in databases with an identifying cookie access key, there is 
no global data definition model permitting the exchange of this particular information. 
                                                          
19  To be effectively anonymous, all the anonymous users should have the same Id but also the same cookie 
duration. Otherwise, the cookie duration can be used as a unique identifier.  
20 http://www.doubleclick.fr/company_info/about_doubleclick/privacy/privacy2.htm  
21  between 5 to 10 opt-out procedures are daily recorded by Double Click, Gauthronet, op. cit., p. 94 
22  The duration, the path, the secure attribute and the domain allowed to get the cookie back. 
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5. The ultimate added value for the cybermarketing remains the interconnection of classical databases with virtual 
databases. However, before doing this, it is important to get a unique identifier for all the netizens.  
1.6 Client-side scripting 
Besides privacy harmful content lying in HTML code, the common browser can be instructed by the Web site to 
download and to execute content included in the HTML page. Those executable contents can be short listed as follows : 
- JavaScript (available on MS Explorer and on Netscape Communicator) 
- Java Applets (available on both browsers) 
- Active-X controls 
- Particular file format only readable by plug-in 
The various security flaws detected and published on the Web will not be detailed here. For example, the Cuartango 
Hole23 can be cited as a practical demonstration how a Web site can access to all the data stored on the physical or 
virtual hard disk of a netizen’s computer. This hole has been tested by the author of this document and it appears to be 
effective. Many others security holes are daily published on the Web24.  
2 Privacy enhancing technologies 
In this chapter, the so-called Privacy Enhancing Technologies are described and analysed. The basic idea of PETS is to 
protect the individual’s privacy by using a technology against privacy-killing technology.  
2.1 P3P 
2.1.1 P3P milestones 
P3P is the anagram of Platform for Privacy Preferences25. There are many steps both at client and at server side to 
achieve a P3P complete process26. 
                                                          
23  http://pages.whowhere.lycos.com/computers/cuartangojc/cuartangoh1.html  
24  By instance : http://www.ntbugtraq.com , a Web site only dedicated to the security flaws of NT systems. 
25 The last working draft of the P3P protocol can be found on the W3C Web site at 
http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/WD-P3P-19990407 . 
26  Source : Joseph Reagle, Lorrie Faith Cranor, “The platform for privacy preferences”,                      
Communications of the ACM, Vol 42, No. 2 (Feb. 1999), Pages 48-55. Available as a W3C note at 
http://www.w3.org/TR/1998/NOTE-P3P-CACM-19981106/#anonymity  
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The netizen will have to fill in a form with some of his personal data like name, address, phone and fax number, SSN, 
CCN, gender, age, etc… Those data will be kept on his own computer. He will specify the purposes for which he is 
willing to communicate some of those data. 
The Web site will have to fill in a similar form indicating what kind of data he intends to use and for which purpose. 
When accessing a Web site for the first time, the Web site will reveal his privacy practices, i.e. the data he wants to 
have and for which purpose. If this proposition matches with the privacy preferences of the netizen, the netizen browser 
will then send an acceptance notification identified by a pairwise or site ID (PUID), unique to every agreement the 
agent reaches with the service. 
If the privacy practices of the Web site and the privacy preferences of the netizen do not match, some process of 
negotiation is foreseen but it is not quite clear how this negotiation will take place. 
When accessing the Web site for the next time, the browser will systematically send this PUID in such a way that the 
Web site can know the privacy preferences matched between the netizen and the Web site. 
The basis of P3P is thus a contract between the user agent and a service. 
The RDF27 (Resource Description Framework) metalanguage provides interoperability between applications that 
exchange machine-understandable information on the Web. By using this metalanguage, the electronic agents will be 
able to use normalised data identifiers all over the Web. If widely adopted, this RDF meta format, can solve the 
problem of the cookie interoperability mentioned above. 
The P3P Preference Exchange Language (APPEL28) offers the opportunity to define disclosures practices in a 
standardised format. Many Web actors will thus be able to provide typical disclosures practices. “P3P includes a 
mechanism for exchanging recommended settings. These "canned" configuration files are expressed by APPEL, A P3P 
Preference Exchange Language. Rather than manually configuring a user agent, a user can select a trusted source 
from which to obtain a recommended setting. These are the settings the user agent will use when browsing the Web on 
behalf of its user”.29 
2.1.2 P3P adequacy vs European Directive requirements. 
It becomes very clear that P3P can achieve two steps towards better privacy practices, namely by providing a better 
data subject information and by granting a right of opposition towards direct marketing. However, the choice of a P3P 
compliant server will not be sufficient to grant the EU privacy compliance of a particular Web site. This is the sense of 
                                                          
27  Resource Description Framework  (RDF) Model and Syntax Specification, W3C Proposed Recommendation,  
05 January 1999, http://www.w3.org/TR/PR-rdf-syntax/  
28  W3C, “A P3P Preference Exchange Language (APPEL)”,  http://www.w3.org/TR/WD-P3P-preferences  
29  Joseph Reagle, Lorrie Faith Cranor, op. cit. 
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the opinion30 expressed by the Group 2931 which stated that : “ There is a risk that P3P, once implemented in the next 
generation of browsing software, could mislead EU-based operators into believing that they can be discharged of 
certain of their legal obligations (e.g. granting individual users a right of access to their data) if the individual user 
consents to this as part of the on-line negotiation. In fact those businesses, organisations and individuals established 
within the EU and providing services over the Internet will in any case be required to follow the rules established in the 
data protection directive 95/46/EC (as implemented in national law) as regards any personal data that they collect and 
process. P3P might thus cause confusion not only among operators as to their obligations, but also among Internet 
users as to the nature of their data protection rights.“ 
Behind the P3P opinion mentioned above, the Group 29 has also produced a recommendation on Invisible Processing 
of Personal Data on the Internet32. By this recommendation, the Group intent to urge the Internet industry to produce 
privacy friendly software and hardware, and namely to give to the user full control over his personal data and profiles. 
EU directive requirement P3P requirement 
Legitimacy [art 4b] P3P in itself offers no guarantee on the legitimacy of the 
processing 
Adequacy [art 4c]) P3P in itself offer no guarantee that the data collected are 
necessary for the declared purpose 
Information of the data subject [art 10] This is the best added value of P3P.  The netizen can a priori 
decide what kind of purpose are legitimate for him. In fact, 
depending on implementation, he will perhaps know the 
purposes of the Web site. The netizen also has the right to 
know the identity of the Web site rather then domain name 
located in the URL 
Right of access [art 12] P3P forsee an access right  
Right of opposition to marketing [art 14 b] P3P in himself can reach this goal with the good client 
settings. One question remains. What will the Web site do if 
a visitor doesn’t want to communicate his data for marketing 
purposes.  
Adequate level of protection for transborder data flow [art 
25]) 
P3P doesn’t perform any check of the kind of data that can 
be transferred outside the European Union 
2.1.3 P3P : a privacy killing or enhancing technology ? 
The P3P is sometimes presented as the solution to solve all privacy problems on the Internet. It is a marketing argument 
that can not be verified.  
P3P can effectively provide better data subject information (depending on the choice done at the implementation stage) 
or enhance opposition towards marketing processing. At the present stage, it is very difficult to appreciate the accuracy 
of P3P before knowing the default settings and the way in which APPEL configuration files will be promoted and 
distributed. 
                                                          
30  Opinion 1/98: Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) and the Open Profiling Standard  (OPS) : 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/wp11fr.pdf.  
31  Group of all European data protection authorities created by the article 29 of the Directive 95/46/EC 
32  Recommendation 1/99 on Invisible and Automatic Processing of Personal Data on the Internet Performed by 
Software and Hardware, available at  
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/wp17en.htm  
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P3P will certainly not grant a global privacy compliance towards the basic EU data protection requirements in spite of 
the fact that it may cause this false impression. 
The privacy killing implementation by the Internet industry of the HTTP protocol have been detailed in chapter 1. The 
question to be answered is to know if a P3P browser will reduce or not the HTTP chattering, the cookie phenomenon or 
the invisible hyperlinks outside the Web site visited. 
The response to this question is negative. The P3P protocol will increase the HTTP chattering, doesn’t intend in itself to 
regulate the cookie problem and will not give to the user more control versus invisible hyperlinks, namely to 
cybermarketing companies located outside the European Union. 
P3P doesn’t solve present problems like the presence and the content of many tens millions European profiles stored in 
New-York by Double Click without the prior knowledge (and consent) of the data subjects. It will not bring a happy 
end to the cookie Jar or to the Intel PSN controversy. 
P3P has been conceived by the W3C, supported by the Internet Industry also perhaps to palliate the weaknesses of the 
existing system of cookies for the cybermarketing industry while presenting this protocol as a privacy enhancing 
technology. It seems to be an argument presented by P3P specialists : “ P3P includes two identifiers that users can 
exchange with services in place of cookies”33. P3P : a enhanced cookie ? This is the opinion expressed by the people 
who have given the "People's Choice" Orwell award to Microsoft Corp. for the Global User ID Number, Open Profiling 
System, and …the proposed P3P standard34. 
2.2 Cookies killers 
To solve the cookie’s privacy issue, two kinds of reactions are analysed below. The first one originates from the 
Internet industry itself and has been incorporated into the main browsers on the market. The second reaction came from 
various privacy activists or software houses. It consists in tools permitting to delete all or some of the cookies. 
2.2.1 The cookie opposition mechanisms implemented by the industry 
In fact, the single visible attempt to solve one of those three problems (browser chattering, invisible hyperlinks, 
cookies) is the cookie opposition mechanism implemented in common browsers since version 3. It is possible for an 
aware netizen to parameterise the browser by choosing 
– to accept every cookie 
– to refuse every coookie or cookie not sent back to the originating server (Netscape) 
– to be asked on a case by case approach 
 
 This attempt remains timorous and inadequate for many reasons:  
                                                          
33  Joseph Reagle, Lorrie Faith Cranor, op. cit., in Chapter “Anonymity and cookies”. 
34  http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC_Alert_6.06.html, point [6]. 
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1. The default setting is the most privacy killing and the average netizen doesn’t know that the cookie is 
widely used by invisible cybermarketing companies to track every keyword typed on search engines. 
2. The cookie blocking mechanism inhibits the reception of new cookies but doesn’t prevent the systematic 
and invisible sending of cookies already received. 
3. Some cookies are useful and not identifying (e.g. preferred language). Others are identifying but privacy 
compliant35. 
4. Several Web sites doesn’t allow client to deny cookies. However, session cookies36 are much less privacy 
killing then persistent cookies. Refusing all the cookies can not be a global solution. 
5. Several Web sites (or the Web sites invisibly hyperlinked) send many cookies and a case by case 
approach will cause a terrible click fatigue 
6. In some cases, the cookie warning37 is not fair but may scare the average netizen by arguing that he will 
receive less information if he refuses cookies. In fact, he will send less information about him in the 
future. 
7. While installing a new browser, the first site (by default the Web site of the browser producer) to be 
visited can send a cookie before the user get the opportunity to deactivate the cookie feature. 
2.2.2 Independent programs 
Some of these programs can be found on http://tucows.belgium.eu.net/cookie95.html . Cookie washer, cookie cutter, 
cookie master or cookie cruncher are some of the freeware or shareware programs that every netizen can download and 
use on the Net. Similar remarks to the above section apply: 
1. The netizen has to process daily its own cookies files on a case by case approach because some cookies 
are not identifying or are privacy compliant. 
2. In the case of shareware programs, the netizen has to pay to protect himself (privacy for the rich) 
3. The cookies handling mechanism remain not straightforward even for a computer specialist (privacy for 
the clever ?) 
2.3 Proxy-servers 
The proxy server is an intermediary server between the netizen and the Net. He is acting as a Web cache, improving 
drastically the performance of the Internet. Many big organisations or Internet Access Providers have already 
implemented such a solution. Each page, each image or logo downloaded from outside by an organisation’s member is 
stored on a cache and will be instantaneously available for another member of this organisation.  
It remains no more necessary that every member of the organisation located before the proxy server own his own 
TCP/IP address, just because they do not directly access to the Internet. Furthermore, the proxy server will normally38 
not transmit the TCP/IP address of the netizen to the Web site and can filter the browser chattering. Because a proxy 
server handle the HTTP protocol, the cookies stored in the HTTP header can therefore easily be removed, changed, 
or… stored by the proxy server. In fact this solution brings many advantages because it doesn’t kill any advertising, 
                                                          
35  See above, point 1.5. 
36  Cookies with no duration mention will not be stored on hard disk but only into the RAM memory 
37  In MSIE 4.O UK, the cookie warning stands as follow : “In order to provide a more personalised browsing 
experience, will you allow this Web site to put information on your computer ? If you click Yes, the Web site 
will save a file on your computer. If you click No, the current Web page  may not display correctly.” The 
courageous netizen has then to click on a new button to know the domain (not the sender !) of the cookie and 
his duration. 
38  Unfortunately some proxies are adding in the HTTP header the TCP-IP address of the PC they are working for. 
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necessary for the financing of some Internet services like search engine. It permits a “one to many” marketing strategy 
towards a aggregate of many persons working in the same organisation (or department, depending on the place and the 
amount of proxy installed; it is possible to install many proxies in cascade). 
2.4 Anonymising services 
Good examples are the anonymiser39 or the “zero knowledge system40.  
The Anonymiser present itself has being able to  
- Act as a intermediary between you and sites you visit, concealing your identity from invasive tracking measures 
- Block hostile Internet programs embedded in the Web page (Java and JavaScript) that may damage your computer 
or gather sensitive personal  
The netizen has to pay to take benefit from anonymous services: $14.99 for 3 months, $49.99 for one year. The netizen 
has always to connect to the Anonymiser Web site to use the anonymising services. It means that this service remains 
very vulnerable to surveillance by the police or the government. The Anonymiser can provide anonymous services such 
as surfing, mailing or file transfer.  
Technically speaking, the Anonymiser is acting as a proxy server and will hide the HTTP browser chattering and the 
TCP-IP address of the surfer. 
The main problem while using this service is that you have to trust to a particular company and that this company will 
be aware of what you’re doing on the Web.  
The zero knowledge system proposes a software called “Freedom”. This solution is based on at least three TCP/IP 
relays combined with heavy (at least 128 bits) encryption. Because the TCP/IP is used by every service on the Net, 
every service is thereby encrypted and anonymized. Each of the three TCP/IP intermediary stations knows only the 
TCP address of the predecessor. They keep no logbook in such a way that even two relays put together are unable to 
trace back the information asked or retrieved. Of course, the routing of the information is dynamic and will be likely to 
change even during a very brief communication. A cookie management system seems to be integrated to Freedom. The 
software is a beta version and the final price is not yet known.  
2.5 Infomediaries  
In this solution, the netizen will chose an infomediary41. “An infomediary, or information intermediary, is a trusted 
person or Web-enabled organization that specializes in information and knowledge services for, about and on behalf of 
                                                          
39  http://www.anonymizer.com/3.0/index.shtml  
40  http://www.zeroknowledge.com  
41  http://www.fourthwavegroup.com/Publicx/1635w.htm 
  Page 13/22 
a virtual community. The infomediary facilitates and stimulates intelligent communication and interaction among the 
members of the virtual community. It administers and cultivates a proprietary knowledge asset that contains content 
and hyperlinks that are of specific interest to the community. In accordance with the privacy constraints that are 
mandated by the virtual community, the infomediary gathers, organizes and selectively releases information about the 
community and its members in order to fulfill the needs of the virtual community…” 
An infomediary company will not sell individual data but will act as an agent to search the better bargain on the Net. 
Furthermore, in many cases, an infomediary company can also purchase the wanted good or service and deliver it to the 
final consumer while leaving him in the darkness of the anonymity. 
The infomediary company can also provide intelligent agents to help the subscribers to accomplish their task. In this 
case the way in which the personal data will be handled 
2.6 The labellisation of privacy 
The labellisation consist of a quality stamp put on the Web site. Since many years, various privacy labels have 
appeared: Trustee42, Privaseek43, the Better Business Bureau44, WebTrust45 are such labelling systems. They are at least 
two main problems raised by the privacy labellisation.  
The first one is the label content. Very often, the simple the label content is far below then the European DP 
requirements. The concept of notice and choice is certainly not sufficient. The right of access, the data minimisation 
principle, the right of opposition, the principle of legitimacy and proportionality, the obligation to notify to the national 
data protection authority are some of the corners stones of the European data protection principles. The main social risk 
is to assist to the widespread dissemination of various privacy labels in Europe. These labels will not necessarily bring 
any serious guarantee to the data subject while giving to the data controllers this false impression. 
The second problem lies in the control of the Web site privacy practices. Many kind of controls can be envisaged. The 
major concern lies in any questions 
- Who will do the control (i.e. how, with which empowerment from the controlled company,…) ? In the worse 
cases, it appears that the controller will be, in a first instance, the data subject himself, with all the difficulties to 
identify the privacy inadequacy with the posted practices, to prove it and to report it to the label controller.  
- Who will pay ? Due to the fact that labelling are privy initiatives and doesn’t benefit from government financing 
support, the labelling organisations will always, less or more be under the pression of the companies that they are 
supposed to control 
                                                          
42  http://www.trustee.org  
43  http://www.privaseek.com  
44  http://www.bbbonline.org/businesses/privacy/index.html  
45  http://www.cpawebtrust.org/consumer/index.html  
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- What will be the sanctions if any ? 
The underlying problem with labellisation is linked to the fact that all the powers lie in the same hands: the label 
content definition, the label attribution and withdrawal, the auditing of the company remains widely often managed by 
the same actor. Because there is no “common” law just like in Europe, every labelling organisation has his own 
interpretation of privacy. Because the financing system is not due to the government, those labelling companies are paid 
by the companies they are auditing; a true independence remains hypothetical. 
The Trustee case is a good illustration of not solving those problems. Among many thousands of complaints, two 
complaints have been made public, primarily not by the Trustee organisation but by the Junkbuster46 association which 
was the plaintiff. 
The first complaint was linked to the Windows 98 online registration wizard. During this registration, it happens that 
the customer has the choice to send or not details about the installed equipment installed on the PC. Whatever can be 
the choice made by the customer, it appears that the detail of installed equipment was always sent by the registration 
wizard47.  
Event “if TRUSTe believes that is important to note that the transfer of Hardware IDs to the Microsoft secure server 
without customer consent did, in TRUSTe's opinion, compromise consumer trust and privacy48, Trustee has considered 
that “ TRUSTe has determined that Microsoft.com was in compliance with all TRUSTe principles”49 
What would have happen if Trustee has come to the conclusion that the Trustee principles ? “ Had TRUSTe determined 
that Microsoft.com had violated its stated practices, TRUSTe would                            have conducted an audit to 
ascertain that sufficient remedies had been put in place.”50 
The idea has circulated on the Web that such a decision was due to the fact that “Microsoft is a premier sponsor of 
TRUSTe and a member of the TRUSTe privacy program, an independent, non-profit initiative”51.  
This story is not anecdotal. During the online registration process a so called HWID (HardWare Identification) number 
was sent to Microsoft. This HWID number shares one common identifying part with the GUID described above. 
Thanks to this ID which is the Ethernet controller world around unique number, Microsoft was52 able to identify the 
author of every Word, Excel or Powerpoint document attached by Email or available on the Web. It is sufficient for the 
author of the document to have filled the registration form with the Windows 98 wizard to be identified by Microsoft. 
                                                          
46  http://www.junkbusters.com  
47  http://www.truste.org/users/ms_process.ppt  
48  http://www.truste.org/users/users_w1723.html  
49  ibidem 
50  ibidem 
51  http://www.microsoft.com/info/privacy.htm  
52  is still, unless those data have been destroyed.  
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Beside the privacy aspects, this will represent a bulk and unfair advantage on every competitor building Operating 
Systems. By systematically gathering equipment information on the maximum number of computers, Microsoft is able 
to know the average installed base of various equipment peripherals or add on cards and is therefore able to propose the 
most strategic drivers53 programs54. 
Furthermore, it permits to Microsoft to detect pirated software easily. If an Office97 document available on the Web 
does not include a GUID related to a registered user, then it is very likely that this document has been produced by an 
illegal copy of an Office 97 program. This provide a second advantage towards competitors who will not be able to 
made a difference between a document produced by a legal or illegal copy. 
2.7 Why is the surfing so privacy killing ? 
The combination of browser chattering, invisible hyperlinks and cookies permit invisible profiling of every individual 
net user using a browser as installed by default. This profiling is not “per se” linked to the HTTP protocol, as it has 
been defined by the W3C55. Even more, the HTTP 1.1 protocol definition has explicitly drawn the attention of the 
industry to possible privacy attempts while doing the implementation of the HTTP protocol56: 
– “Having the user agent describe its capabilities in every request can be both very inefficient (given that 
only a small percentage of responses have multiple representations) and a potential violation of the 
user's privacy” [page 68 below] 
– “ It may be contrary to the privacy expectations of the user to send an Accept-Language header with the 
complete linguistic preferences of the user in every request” [page 98] 
– “ The client SHOULD not send the From header57 field without the user's approval, as it may conflict 
with the user's privacy interests or their site's security policy. It is strongly recommended that the user be 
able to disable, enable, and modify the value of this field at any time prior to a request.” [page 118] 
– “HTTP clients are often privy to large amounts of personal information  (e.g. the user's name, location, 
mail address, passwords, encryption keys, etc.), and SHOULD be very careful to prevent unintentional 
leakage of this information via the HTTP protocol to other sources. We very strongly recommend that a 
convenient interface be provided for the user to control dissemination of such information, and that 
designers and implementers be particularly careful in this area. History shows that errors in this area 
are often both serious security and/or privacy problems, and often generate highly adverse publicity for 
the implementer's company.” [page 143] 
– etc : The word “privacy appears 18 times in the RFC 2068. 
 
                                                          
53  programs delivered with the OS and permitting to the OS to interoperate with an external device or an add on 
card 
54  http://www.microsoft.com/ntserver/nts/news/msnw/LinuxMyths.asp : “Linux does not provide support for the 
broad range of hardware in use today; Windows NT 4.0 currently supports over 39,000 systems and devices on 
the Hardware Compatibility List”. 
55  The World Wide Web Consortium is a non-profit organisation hosted by Inria (France), MIT (USA) and the 
University of Keio (Japan). The members of this consortium are notably Microsoft, AOL, Netscape, …and 
Center for Democracy and Technology (http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Member/List). This consortium 
produces non-mandatory but de facto normalisation intended to guarantee the interoperability of computers on 
the Internet. In fact, it appears that the HTTP protocol 
56  http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2068/rfc2068 . The page numbering indicated between brackets refer to the 
numeration of W3C. 
57  Note of the author : From header field is used for naming the referring page 
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This last point demonstrates that the common surfing programs are privacy killing, by the implementation choices done 
by the Internet industry and that the Internet is not privacy killing in itself.  
Even if the client programs like the browsers (having newsgroup, file transfer, email and surfing capabilities) are 
distributed for free, their conception is very much more complicated than the setting up of equivalent server programs. 
Such servers are not distributed free to the companies. E-commerce companies are paying for the distribution, at a 
world wide level of a very specific client-server technology. This technology is not designed to preserve the privacy of 
the netizen, only perceived as a possible customer that must be profiled as much as possible. 
3 Conclusion : A Paradigm Shift in the Data Protection 
of the Consumer 
3.1 Identified, identifiable and anonymous individuals 
I will not enter the debate of identifying what kind of information are private and what kind of information isn’t. What 
can be considered as an axiom is that privacy is a personal feeling. So does the general data protection directive 95/46 
CE58. It doesn’t define what is privacy but only creates rights for the data subjects and duties for controllers when 
personal data are processed. The problem then lies in the definition of personal data. Following art 2 (a) of the DP 
Directive: 'personal data' shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data 
subject'); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity. Recital 26 of the DP directive add that “ to determine whether a person is identifiable, account should 
be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other person to identify the said 
person”. On the Internet, this means that if a data controller knows an identification number, one or more specific 
factors related to the economic, cultural or social identity of the individual who is behind the screen, this individual is 
identified.  
The Internet network is based on the TCP/IP protocol. Every netizen is transmitting this TCP/IP 59 address while using 
a service on the Net. The TCP/IP addresses range are attributed on the world level60 to IAP. Those addresses are then 
sold or hired to organisation or individuals. By using a public service like http://www.ripe.net/cgi-bin/whois it is always 
possible to identify the responsible of a particular TCP/IP address attribution. Typically, this responsible will be 
                                                          
58  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data” (published 
in the OJEC of 23 Nov 1995, L281, p.31). Full text is available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/lif/dat/1995/en_395L0046.html  
59  This is linked to the nature of the TCP/IP protocol. TCP/IP is a packet switching, connectionless protocol. 
Every information packet incorporates the TCP/IP address of the sender and of the recipient.  
60  The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is the non-profit corporation that was 
formed to assume responsibility for the IP address space allocation (http://www.icann.org). In Europe the 
addressing space is managed by the RIPE organisation  (Réseaux IP Européens) (http://www.ripe.net) 
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 the manager of a Local Area Network linked with Internet (e.g. : a SME or a public administration). In this case, he 
will probably use fixed IP addressing scheme and keep a list of correspondence between people’s computers and 
TCP/IP addresses. If this responsible is using the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP61), the DHCP 
program will typically keep a log book where the Ethernet card number will be written. This world around unique 
number identify a particular computer in the LAN. 
 A Internet Access Provider having a contract with a Internet subscriber. In this case, the IAP will typically keep a 
log file with the attributed TCP/IP address, subscriber’s ID, date, time and duration of the address attribution. 
Furthermore, if the netizen is using a public telecommunication network (mobile or residential phone), the called 
number will be registered by the phone company for billing purposes 
In both cases, this is to mean that a third party, well and easily knowable by the Internet, can identify (i.e. knowing the 
civil identity (name, address, phone, …)) the netizen by using reasonable means. 
An IP address is a world around unique number related to one computer at a certain moment62. Due to the nature of the 
Internet network, this TCP/IP address (a unique number) will always be sent to each visited Web site along with the 
name of the page requested. By default, most of the Web servers will store in a logfile, at least 
 TCP-IP address 
 Date and time of the request 
 Full name of the page requested (including parameters like keywords to be searched) 
 … More personal data are sent in the HTTP header and can be added in the logfile. 
By cumulating the browser chattering and the invisible hyperlink effects, all the advertising agencies will get the same 
information vs the Internet pages on which they are uploading ads in real time. 
DoubleClick, one of the big cybermarketing agencies63, made a big difference between non-personally identifiable 
information and personally-identifiable information64. Following DoubleClick assertions, only non-personally-
identifiable information is processed by the agency. Unfortunately, this distinction doesn’t match the legal distinction 
made by the Directive 95/46 between personal data and anonymous data for two distinct reasons. 
                                                          
61  The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is an Internet protocol for automating the configuration                       
of computers that use TCP/IP. DHCP can be used to automatically assign IP addresses. (http://www.dhcp.org)  
62  Whatever can be the duration of the address assignment. Even if it is a dynamic address, this address is an 
identifying number at  least during the duration of the Internet connection of the netizen.  
63  more then 500,000,000 advertising banners sent each day :
 http://www.doubleclick.net/company_info/investor_relations/financials/analyst_metrics.htm  
64  http://www.doubleclick.net/company_info/about_doubleclick/privacy . : “ DoubleClick does not collect  any 
personally-identifiable information about you, such as your name, address, phone number or email address. 
DoubleClick does, however, collect certain non-personally-identifiable information about you, such as the 
server your computer is logged onto or your browser type (for example, Netscape or Internet Explorer).” 
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If not hidden by a non chattering proxy server, the TCP-IP address of the netizen is always sent to DoubleClick. As 
explained above, in most of the cases, this TCP/IP address will enable an  intermediary to identify one particular 
person.  
Even if the TCP/IP address is hidden by a privacy compliant proxy, an identifying cookie originally sent by 
DoubleClick has been stored by default by the browser on the netizen hard disk. This cookie will be sent back to 
DoubleClick before each time an advertising banner is uploaded on the screen of the netizen. This cookie is an “ 
identification number”. This number is associated, in DoubleClick’s database, with a list of various data like65 
1. The country where the netizen lives 
2. The Internet domain to which he belongs 
3. Sector of activity of the company employing the netizen 
4. Turnover and size of the employing company 
5. Function and position of the surfer within this company 
6. Internet Access Provider 
7. Typology of Web sites currently visited 
8. The keywords typed on important search engines 
9. Some of the Web pages visited  
10. The browser used by the netizen 
11. The brand and type of the OS used by the netizen 
12. … 
 
which are undoubtedly “factors specific to the … economic, cultural or social identity” of a particular netizen. 
In the specific case of DoubleClick, it is important to notice the recent merging between this company and Abacus, a 
“cooperative membership database, contains records from more than 1,100 merchandise catalogs, with more than 2 
billion consumer transactions from virtually all U.S. consumer catalog buying households”66. Technically speaking, it 
was sufficient for DoubleClick to advertise on a Web site owned by Abacus to be able to merge, one a one-to-one 
basis, “anonymous” profiles with particular customers of Abacus. 
3.2 The E-Commerce privacy paradigm shift 
When I was a child, my parents always looked at the door of the store they were intending to come in to check if there 
was an “entrée libre” label. The meaning was that in the stores showing this label it was possible to simply visit without 
buying anything. Nowadays, it seems clear to everybody that it is possible to exit a supermarket without any purchase. 
Privacy is not only a set of legal rules described or not in a text of law, but firstly a modus vivendi, social rules 
unanimously known and applied both by the client and the merchant. Nowadays, it seems clear that anybody can visit a 
store and even purchase some goods without systematically leaving any trace (if he pay cash). Nowadays, the 
advertising banners visible in the stores don’t remember who was reading their message and where he does come from.  
                                                          
65 Serge Gauthronet, “On-line services and data protection and the protection of privacy” European Commission, 
1998, p.31 and 92 available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/media/dataprot/studies/servint.htm 
66  http://www.abacus-direct.com  
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Let’s have a look at what happen on a standard computer (i.e. equipped with a Intel Pentium III and with a common 
browser installed by default) to the “netizen on the street” who enters a E-commerce Web site.  
The car the customer is using (brand, age, color = operating system type, type of processor), his equipment (browser’s 
type, version, subversion, is MS Office installed or not ?), the language he speaks and the place where he has found the 
store address (the referring page; see above) are systematically and imperceptibly communicated to the store manager 
on an electronic, easy to process form. It seems unclear if the store manager has the ability to read the frame serial 
number (=Pentium Serial Number) but this possibility is not to be excluded. The store manager can seamlessly stick an 
identifying bar code under the bumper of the car. He will record all the motion of this particular (identified by a bar 
code) customer, the goods he looks at, the goods he doesn’t look at, the goods that he will put in his shopping basket 
and the goods that he will put back in the right (?) shelves. 
The advertising company knows in real time all the data above (thanks to the browser chattering that is the same 
towards both Web sites voluntary visited and Web sites invisibly linked). The advertising company can stick his own 
bar code (cookie) under the bumper of the car. This will allow the recognition of this particular customer if he enter to 
another shop where this company is advertising. It will choose in real time the banners that will be posted just before 
the customer will enter a particular department. It will notice what are the banners interesting the customer and add all 
those data to the customer anonymous profile. 
This is not a fiction, but what happens seamlessly and daily to many tens millions of European netizens on the Web. 
The main problem underlying the privacy on the Web is that the way in which the electronisation of the commerce has 
been performed constitutes a radical change in a social privacy consensus between consumers and merchants. Even if 
this has not been the original, deliberate or conscious purpose of the merchants, the technology that has been widely 
implemented by the Internet industry is radically modifying, at least at the privacy point of view, the socially accepted 
way in which customer and commercial companies exchange and share personal information. 
By doing this kind of domestic-economic-electronic spying, E-commerce and advertising companies as a whole are in 
the long term promoting mistrust on the Web. Even if they are widely used, those spying techniques remain hidden in 
the darkness of the millions of code lines of browsing software. In most of the cases, they are brought to light by 
chance, echoed and amplified on various media. There is a rising risk of generating a privacy paranoia that will keep 
netizens away from the Web even if the privacy killing risks suddenly disappears or significantly decreases. 
4 Recommandations 
4.1 The dead-end of individual Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies 
We have shown that in privacy killing technological environment, the are various solutions permitting to an aware rich 
and clever user to protect himself against various but well determined risks. We do not consider that this solution is the 
best solution. It may be compared to the distribution of gas mask to solve the air pollution problem or of bulletproof 
jackets to reduce the criminality. Of course, even if those equipment’s are be distributed free (it is not the case for all 
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privacy enhancing technologies), the will probably be in a short-term view a significant decrease of dead by inhalation 
or crimes. In the long term, there will be a rise of the air pollution (why reduce the air pollution if everybody is 
protected?) and probably the apparition of enhanced killing guns able to go through bulletproof jackets.  
This solution is not a long-term solution. Furthermore, a subtle perversion exists in this promotion of individual privacy 
enhancing technologies. Suddenly, the data subject is no more protected by law enforcement but has to continuously 
protect himself by buying, installing, controlling and maintaining technical knowledge. The Directive 95/46 clearly 
puts some obligations on the shoulders of processors, not on the shoulders of the data subjects. Just because, in the 
European Union, privacy is fundamental human right that belongs to the public order and must therefore be granted to 
every European netizen, poor or rich, clever or not. 
4.2 Where are the privacy-enhanced technologies? 
The very brief privacy auditing of current Internet technologies has demonstrated that many privacy killing features 
have been put (and hidden?) in various popular programs, not by necessity but by choice of the Internet industry. It is 
amazing to observe that many fundamental privacy-killing features (like the GUID of Microsoft or the presence of 
cookies in invisible hyperlinks) have been discovered by chance. How many other privacy-killing features are still 
hidden into the depth of millions of computer code lines?  
Whenever such features are made public, the industrial response is inefficient. For instance, to solve the GUID 
problem, the conscious netizen may have to spend many hours to download efficient patches. The cookies warning 
features as implemented in version 4 of the most popular browsers remains unusable. The default is always the most 
privacy-killing. Etc. 
What is dramatically missing in the European Union is a technological and a priori control on the importation of 
privacy killing software. It remains utopia to believe that efficient control on data protection on information 
“highways” can be reached without controlling the software (=the cars) used to accomplish personal data transfer. The 
netizen is acting as a push button agent, still believing that he controls his data while some data transfer are seamlessly 
happening under the remote control of the authors of the software. 
The underlying problem to this idle talk of the Internet industry can perhaps be found in the indirect financing of free 
browsers by the merchants. As long as the netizen in the street will not be aware of the privacy killing features hidden 
in the common browsers, he will be unable to produce a valid choice, even if the privacy seems to be a major criteria of 
his personal choice.  
4.3 The IAP as a infomediary 
Opposed to the Internet industries, the Internet Access Providers are mainly paid by the data subjects. Contrasting with 
the data subjects, they have the technological knowledge to understand the privacy killing features hidden in the 
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software agents67. A proxy-server is today an industry standard feature widely used to spare bandwidth. Some proxy-
servers68 can be configured to filter browser chattering, cookies and invisible hyperlinks and hide the original IP 
address of the data subject. In such a way, anonymity can technically be reached. 
At a first glance, this privacy compliance does not bring any advantage to the IAP. “Companies playing the 
infomediary role will become the custodians, agents, and brokers of customer information, marketing it to businesses 
(and providing them with access to it) on consumers' behalf, while at the same time protecting their privacy”.69 
In the actual cybermarketing model, profiling is performed by invisible companies without the knowledge (and 
therefore without the free consent) of the data subject. The personal data coming from different sources are merged to 
form a global privacy profile that can then be sold. 
In the model of the infomediary, every ISP or Web site will act as an anonymising service to keep for itself the benefit 
of marketing. He can propose Intelligent Agent Software to the customer, negotiate for mass buy, directly advertise 
towards the customers, etc… 
This model will generate new opportunities and new revenues for European Internet companies and will avoid the risk 
of centralisation of personal data outside the European Union. 
4.4 The mutual recognition of Internet Software as a 
significant component of telecommunications terminal 
equipment 
The Directive 1999/5/EC on radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment and the mutual recognition 
of their conformity define (art. 2 (b)) a telecommunication terminal equipment as a “product enabling communication 
or a relevant component thereof which is intented to be connected directly or indirectly by any means whatsoever to 
interfaces of public telecommunications networks”. A browser can thereby be considered as a telecommunication 
equipment. 
The same directive states that the Commission may decide that apparatus70 …shall be constructed that it (c) 
incorporates safeguards to ensure that the personal data and privacy of the user or of the subscriber are protected”. 
                                                          
67  We will not develop here the concept of Intelligent Software Agent while this notion tends to evaluate but 
appears nowadays as one of the best way to produce anonymising and added value services on the Web 
68  So is, for instance, the free proxy-server proposed by JunkBuster (http://www.junkbuster.com/ijb.html ) 
69  Who Can Be an Infomediary?  John Hagel III and Marc Singer (Adapted from Net Worth: Shaping Markets 
When Customers Make the Rules, Harvard Business School Press, January 1999), 
http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu/ideasatwork/hagel_singer.html  
70  Note of the author : following art. 2 (a) an “apparatus is namely a telecommunications terminal equipment” 
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4.5 EU must promote law and technology convergence. 
The best way to do that is to promote dialogue between lawyers and computer scientist. At the first hand, it appears that 
the national data protection authorities have a weak technological background. At the other hand, it seems clear that 
privacy issues raised by various Internet technologies were foreseeable but have been neglected by  the industry.  
Let’s take one concrete example. In the Intel Pentium III case, a less privacy killing way was to include not a serial 
number identification instruction, but a serial number verification instruction. In the first scenario, an active 
component71 is able to get the PSN. In the second case, the active component is only able to check is a serial number 
freely given by the netizen is the exact serial number of the installed processor. The authentication function of the PSN 
is preserved while the privacy killing aspect is widely reduced. This is only a suggestion but it seems me clear that it is 
almost always possible to reduce privacy killing side effect while keeping technological efficiency, if the privacy 
requirements are put in the product specification at the very beginning. If the privacy concern is not taken into account, 
the only solution is to build so-called privacy enhancing technologies that protect the clever and the rich. This is a time 
and resources consuming process which largely contributes to maintain mistrust on the Web. 
The next two technological privacy issues are the P3P protocol and the new Ipv6 protocol which will permit to each 
netizen to get a personal static IP address for his whole life. 
 
 
                                                          
71  like an Active-X control or a Java applet 
